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TREATMENT OF LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES
IN BANKRUPTCY
The bankruptcy decisions indicate that courts are experiencing considerable
difficulty in determining when a bankrupt's life insurance policy is available to
his creditors and when it is free from their claims. The problem arises because
such insurance serves different functions. While it is primarily a device for protecting dependents, cash surrender value causes life insurance to have an inevitable investment feature. As an investment, the policy is considered to be an
asset of the insured available to his creditors., However, the public policy reflected in the Bankruptcy Act 2 and in state insurance exemption statutes which
are given full effect by the Bankruptcy Act, requires that the protection feature be preserved for dependents of the bankrupt. Courts, therefore, are faced
with the problem of separating and protecting the conflicting interests of creditors and dependents.
Subsections (3) and (5) of Section 70(a) of the Bankruptcy Act allow the
trustee to obtain the cash surrender value of a life insurance policy whenever
that value can be obtained by the insured bankrupt.3 Since this would result
in cancellation of the policy, a proviso in the Act permits the bankrupt to retain
the protection value of his insurance by substituting property not available to
the creditors in an amount equal to the cash surrender value, e.g., by having the
beneficiaries or relatives pay the amount required.4
I The circumstances under which life insurance policies are assets of the insured's estate
are defined in the Bankruptcy Act, at § 70(a), 52 Stat. 840, 879 (x938), ii U.S.C.A. § iio(a)
(1949).
Ibid., at § 6, 52 Stat. 847 (1938), Ix U.S.C.A. § 24 (1949), reads: "This act shall not affect

the allowance to bankrupts of the exemptions which are prescribed by the laws of the United
States or by the State laws in force at the time of the filing of the petition...."
3 52 Stat. 879 (x938), ii U.S.C.A. §§ iio(a)(3), iio(a)(5) (949). Subsection (3) makes
any power which the insured may exercise for his own benefit an asset of his estate. See note 1o
infra. Subsection (5) defines property which the bankrupt might transfer or assign as an asset
of his estate. The courts have limited the trustee's recovery to the cash surrender value of
policies. Cohen v. Samuels, 245 U.S. 50 (1917) explains this limitation, holding that the proceeds of life insurance policies are available at maturity only, which is too remote to be dealt
with by the bankruptcy courts. Accord: Everett v. Judson, 228 U.S. 474 (1913); Burlingham v.
Crouse, 228 U.S. 459 (1913). This would mean that straight term life insurance policies, without any cash surrender value, would not come within the scope of Section 70(a). Similarly, a
policy with cash surrender value payable to the beneficiary would not be an asset of the insured's estate if the right to change the beneficiary were not retained. The beneficiary, in such
a case, would haveavested interest in the policy. In re Cooper's Estate, 28 F. 2d 438 (D. Md.,
1928). If the beneficiary became bankrupt, his creditors would have a right to the cash value
of the policy. Wolter v. Johnston, 34 F. 2d 598 (C.A. 3d, 1929); In re Hogan, 194 Fed. 846
(C.A. 7th, 1912). For a discussion of the general rules concerning life insurance in bankruptcy
see Putting Life Insurance Beyond the Claims of Trustees in Bankruptcy, 3 Univ. Chi. L.
Rev. 303 (1936).
4 Bankruptcy Act, at § 70(a)(5), 52 Stat. 879 (1938), 1I U.S.C.A. § xio(a)(5) (i949). If it
were not for this proviso the trustee's right to the surrender value would cause a cancellation
of the policy, since the trustee must give up the policy to the insurance company in order to
gain the cash value. Cf. Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., io4 F. 2d 573 (C.A. 7th, i939);
Ehrhart v. New York Life Ins. Co., 45 F. 2d 804 (S.D. Ill., 1929). It was thought at first that
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State insurance exemption statutes, given effect by the Bankruptcy Act,'
qualify the operation of Section 70(a), and are designed to provide additional
protection for dependents of the insured. 6 Today these statutes generally exempt the cash surrender value payable to a dependent-beneficiary even though
power to change beneficiaries is retained by the insured. 7 Since under Section
70(a)(3) the trustee in bankruptcy could otherwise exercise this power to name
the insured's estate beneficiary, and obtain the cash value of the policy for the
creditors, 8 the effect of exemption statutes is to place what would be assets of the
insured's estate under Section 70(a)(3) beyond the reach of creditors.
The protection given by exemptions has naturally been challenged by creditors whenever an insolvent has attempted to create exempt insurance or has
utilized existing insurance in a manner which seemed inconsistent with a desire
to protect dependents. When the policy was created before insolvency and yet
was not exempt, an assignment or surrender of the power to change beneficiaries
during insolvency normally has been governed by the rules of fraud and preference found in the Bankruptcy Act.9 These rules are not applied to exempt insurance policies, since such transactions would not reduce the amount of assets
available to creditors."'
only an insured bankrupt could avail himself of the saving feature of the proviso. Cohen v.
Samuels, 245 U.S. 50 (1917). However, it has been held that a bankrupt beneficiary can also
utilize the proviso. Curtis v. Humphrey, 78 F. 2d 73 (C.A. 5 th, 1935) held that where the cash
surrender value is considered part of the beneficiary's estate (see note 3 supra), the beneficiary
may avail himself of the proviso by paying an equivalent amount to the trustee.
5 Bankruptcy Act, at § 70(a), 52 Stat. 879 (1938), ii U.S.C.A. § iio(a) (1949) reads (in
part) "except ... as... to property which is held to be exempt.. . ." See also note 2 supra.
6The state has an interest in seeing that the creditors do not completely strip the family

unit of funds which will guard them against future contingencies. Rather than shift the burden
to the state, exemption statutes carve out some of the estate available to the creditors. Exemptions are merely the legislative formulation of this underlying policy consideration. The ensuing discussion, concerning the courts' treatment of exemption statutes must be thought of
in terms of this fundamental policy.
7Typical modem exemption statutes are N.Y. Ins. Law (McKinney, 1949) § i66 [formerly § 55(a)], and Ill. Rev. Stat. (1949) c. 73, § 850, which reads: "All proceeds payable because of the death of the insured and the aggregate net cash value of any or all life
and endowment policies and annuity contracts payable to a wife or husband of the insured,
or to a child, parent or other person dependent upon the insured, whether the power to change
beneficiary is reserved to the insured or not, and whether the insured or his estate is a contingent beneficiary or not, shall be exempt ... except as to premiums paid in fraud of creditors
within the period limited by law for the recovery thereof."
8

Bankruptcy Act, at § 70(a)(3), 52 Stat. 879 (1938), ii

U.S.C.A. § Ilo(a)(3) (i949);

Cohen v. Samuels, 245 U.S. 5o (I917).
9Kirkpatrick v. Johnson, 197 Fed. 235 (E.D. Pa., 1912), held that the trustee could recover
an insurance policy assigned to the insured's wife without consideration while the insured was
insolvent. See Glenn, Fraudulent Conveyances § 270 (1931). The strict rules, disregarding
exemption statutes, are found in the Bankruptcy Act, § 67(d)(2), 52 Stat. 877 (1938), 11
U.S.C.A. § 107(d)(2) (i949) (fraudulent conveyances), and § 6o, 52 Stat. 869 (1938), 1i
U.S.C.A. § 96 (1949) (preferences).
ze Crosby v. Packer, 22 F. 2d 61 (C.A. Ist, 1927); In re Shurte, 39 F. 2d ioo (E.D. Ill.,
1930).
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The immune status of exempt insurance created before insolvency has been
questioned only when an insolvent insured has attempted to make the cash
value of the policy available to himself. Some courts allow the insured to exercise the exempt power to change beneficiaries for his own benefit. The insolvent
may borrow on, or surrender the policy, and the funds obtained will not be
available to creditors., Other courts, notably those of New York, feel that since
the exemption statutes are designed to protect dependents, use of the insurance
inconsistent with that purpose should not be allowed. They hold that the exemption is defeated when the insured attempts to realize all or part of the cash
value of the policy.The most difficult cases in this field have arisen when a debtor attempts to
maintain or create exempt insurance during insolvency with premiums drawn
from funds clearly available to creditors. 3 Such transfers for the benefit of third
parties are clearly fraudulent transfers under the Bankruptcy Act; yet the state
exemptions would provide only limited protection for dependents if all such payments were to be forbidden. Insolvency could prevent the payment of premiums
and cause existing policies to lapse. Faced with this dilemma courts have tended
to compromise the fraud provisions in order to give a liberal construction to the
4
exemption statutes.
While it is fairly easy to understand the need for a certain amount of protection for dependents, there are a number of irritating situations where motivations other than the protection of dependents are involved or where it is necessary to limit the type and amount of protection allowed. For example, a substantial part of the premium may be devoted to increasing the cash surrender
value of the policy while the death benefits remain quite small. Perhaps the insured has borrowed on the policy and during insolvency desires to restore its
original face value. The debtor may have had little or no insurance and then
decided, during insolvency, to increase his insurance or take out a new policy.
Courts have displayed different attitudes toward these situations, and the extent to which they allow conversion of non-exempt property into exempt insur11In re Bosak, 12 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Pa., 1935); In re Vaughn,

2

F. Supp. 385 (S.D. Fla.,

1932).
12This position is that exemptions may be revocable, as opposed to the view that exemptions once established are permanent even though the insured "takes advantage" of the
exemption for his own benefit. The principal case in point is In re Messinger, 29 F. 2d 158
(C.A. 2d, 1928); see also Schwartz v. Holzman, 69 F. 2d 814 (C.A. 2d, 1934); Butler v. Rand,

ii F. Supp. 343 (E.D.N.Y., 1935); In re Weisman, io F. Supp. 312 (S.D.N.Y., 1934); In re

Horwitz, 3 F. Supp. i6 (W.D.N.Y., 1933).
13 Where exempt insurance is created by other exempt funds, the transaction is upheld by
applying the non-diminution of assets doctrine, Schwartz v. Seldon, 153 F. 2d 334 (C.A. 2d,
'945).
14 Whenever there is conflict between the state exemption statutes and the rest of the Bankruptcy Act, the state exemption statutes take precedence. Holden v. Stratton, 198 U.S. 202
(igoS). This case is also authority for the doctrine that state exemptions are to be liberally

construed. See also In re Horwitz, 3 F. Supp. 16 (W.D.N.Y., 1933); Forsberg v. Security State
Bank, IS F. 2d 499 (C.A. 8th, 1926).
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ance can only be gauged by the various meanings given the fraud provisions in
the Bankruptcy Act.
The Illinois Supreme Court early indicated its willingness to effect the policy
of exemption statutes at the expense of creditors.' s In Cole v. Marple6a husband
held an insurance policy naming his personal representative as beneficiary. This
policy was not exempt under the existing exemption statute which only covered policies taken out by a wife, in her own favor, on her husband's life.' 7 After
becoming insolvent he assigned the policy to his wife. The court held that the
assignment was not fraudulent, but rather created an exemption, reasoning that
the effect was the same as if the wife had initially taken out the policy on her
husband's life.' 8 Had the assignment been made to someone other than a member of the insured's family, it probably would have been invalidated under the
general doctrine prohibiting such transfers. Here the assignment was designed
to retain the protection value of the insurance and the court undoubtedly felt
that the policy of the statute should extend to this situation.19
In Forsberg v. Security State Bank,20 involving a conversion of nonexempt
property into insurance during insolvency, the court refused to Ind any evidence of fraud, stating that since the insured "was merely doing what the law
allowed him to do, no extrinsic fact or circumstance being present to indicate
fraud, [this] did not constitute a transfer of bankrupt's property with intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.. .. ": The decision clearly indicates that
more than fraudulent diversion under the Bankruptcy Act is required by some
courts to impeach this type of transfer, since the mere diversion of property
from creditors during insolvency is normally all that need be proved.-2
'S Cole v. Marple, 98 Ill. 58 (i88i). Predating the Federal Bankruptcy Act by seventeen
years, the law on fraudulent transfers involved in the case was state law. This case is a clear
example of how courts behave when a desire to aid dependents comes into conffict with certain
well established rules relating to fraudulent conveyances. The existence of the state exemption
statute offers the courts a "way out" since they can extend the statute to cover borderline
cases. See note i9 infra.
6

Ibid.

'7 The

exemption law involved was the Illinois Married Women's Insurance Exemption

Act of i869, Ill. Rev. Stat. (i93s) c. 73, § 342; repealed by § 238 of the Illinois Insurance Code
of 1937, Ill. Rev. Stat. (X949) c. 73, § 85o.
18 See note x7 supra. Cole v. Marple, 98 Ill. 58 (188i) represents the judicial extension of

that statute. Such an extension is no longer necessary, because of the breadth of the new
statute.
'9 The fact situation in the case is identical to the facts in Kirkpatrick v. Johnson, 197 Fed.
235 (E.D. Pa., 1912), note 9 supra, where, in the absence of an exemption statute, the court
held the assignment to be fraudulent. The cases can only be distinguished by the willingness of

the Cole court to "liberalize" the exemption statute and provide a haven for the heretofore
nonexempt policy.
20 15 F. 2d 499 (C.A. 8th, 1926).

hIbid.,
at 500.
- It might be argued that sufficient consideration is received in the exchange of nonexempt
for exempt property to validate the transfer. But the argument fails when it is noted that the
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The cases dealing with payment of premiums during insolvency indicate the
ease or reluctance with which courts find an "extrinsic fact or circumstance"
indicative of fraud. Ross v. Minnesota Mutual Life Ins. Co.2 represents the
standard most frequently applied. Though the state exemption expressly excepted premiums paid in fraud of creditors, the court held that an insolvent
husband could rightfully devote a moderate portion of his earnings to the payment of premiums on exempt insurance without being held to intend "to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors. ' 24The court believed that the policy of protecting dependents required creditors to prove something called actual fraudulent intent? 5
Some federal courts, in bankruptcy proceedings, have disapproved such decisions, but have been forced to follow state court interpretations of local ex3

emption laws. 6 However, in Doetklaff v. Penn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. 27 a federal

court willingly accepted a similar interpretation of a state (Ohio) exemption
statute and gave some indication of what is meant by actual fraudulent intent.
Intent, the court said by way of dictum, should be determined by the circumstances under which premiums are paid, the attitude of the debtor towards his
creditors, and the time at which the policy was issued (the crucial distinction
being between policies issued before and policies issued after insolvency).
Judging from its dictum, the Doethlaff court would probably void premiums
paid on insurance taken out after insolvency or increased premiums designed
to raise the face value of the policy. 21Such premiums would indicate an intent
"to take advantage" of creditors. However, payment of premiums as they become due on insurance created before insolvency would probably be permitted.
"consideration" received is not available to creditors, as was the transferred property. If we
assume that the exchange was for sufficient consideration, it should follow that the new policy
created by the exchange would be nonexempt. The contrary result is but another indication
of a common judicial disposition to construe liberally the state exemptions in derogation of the
relevant fraud provisions in the Bankruptcy Act.
23

154 Minn. 186, rr N.W. 428

(1923).

Ibid. See also Central Bank of Washington v. Hume, 128 U.S. 195 (1888).
2sRoss v. Minnesota Mutual Life Ins. Co., i54 Minn. I86, igI N.W. 428 (1923).
26There is some feeling in the federal courts that the state exemption laws should not be
interpreted in a manner inconsistent with the strict fraud rules. This feeling is voiced in
Greiman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 96 F. 2d 823 (C.A. 3 d, 1938), where the court said, at
825: "Assuming that this policy is one providing a haven for fraud, we are nevertheless bound
by the decisions of the courts of New Jersey interpreting an exemption law of that state."
27 117 F. 2d 582 (C.A. 6th, I941).
28 The single premium policy, often looked on as away of quickly placing assets beyond the
reach of creditors, would fall victim to this rule if the single premium was paid after insolvency.
The Doethlaff rule would also void repayments of loans on policies after the insured becomes
insolvent, since such repayment, strictly speaking, does not preserve what existed before insolvency. The distinction between repayment of loans and the payment of premiums is that
the latter is necessary to maintain the policy, while the former has no effect on the vitality
24

of the policy, although both transactions create new value.
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The Doetldaff position raises only one serious question: inequality in treatment
of bankrupts. Compare two parties who have held insurance for a number of
years before becoming insolvent, but whose policies differ greatly in value.
Under the Doethlaff view it would seem logical to allow continued payment of
premiums during insolvency even though the amounts required differed considerably. It is likely, however, that courts would apply the qualification of the
Ross case, only permitting moderatepremiums to be made. Though the Doethlaff
case does not mention the amount of the premium as a factor in determining
intent, it would probably treat a large premium as being outside its area of concern for dependents and therefore apply the rules of fraud as they are normally
interpreted.
Shifting from the middle ground of the Ross-Doethlaffline of decisions, there
are other cases which take the extreme and opposite attitudes in striking a balance between the fraud provisions of the Bankruptcy Act and the state exemption statutes. For example, the court in In Re Silansky9 completely discarded
the doctrine of fraudulent transfers in this field. In construing the Pennsylvania
exemption, it stated that the statute protected policies whether or not they had
been created with an intention to defraud creditors. Payment of premiums and
repayment of loans on policies during insolvency were similarly protected.30
The other extreme has been reflected in the decisions in New York and probably Illinois.3' The early Illinois decisions disallowed any premiums paid while
the insured was insolvent.3' In Houston v. Maddux3 the court stated that the
clause in the exemption statute prohibiting payment of premiums in fraud of
creditors would be construed so that such transfers would be treated like any
other conveyance made during insolvency. The federal courts in New York
have interpreted that state's exemption statute in the same manner, again treating the payment of premiums34 or repayment of loans 35 during insolvency as
fraudulent, regardless of intent. Under this view the insured is forced either to
drop the policy after insolvency, rely on friends to pay premiums pending a discharge in bankruptcy, or sell exempt property to meet obligations under the
policy. There remains, however, some incentive to pay premiums, though
29 21 F. Supp. 4E (E.D. Pa., 1937). This is a minority interpretation, and probably represents an overzealous regard for dependents coupled with utter disregard for creditors. Under
such an extreme doctrine the insured is actually invited to take advantage of his creditors.
301Ibid., at 44.

31There are no decisions under the new Illinois exemption, but the exception of premiums
paid in fraud of creditors follows the wording of the Act of 1869, so the decisions under that
Act have some determinative weight on the interpretation of the new statute. See Vieth v.
Chicago Title and Trust Co., 307 I1.App. 99, 103, 3o N.E. 2d 126, 128 (i94o).
32 Houston v. Maddux, 179 Ill. 377, 53 N.E. 599 (z899); Ramsey v. Nichols, 73 Ill. App.
643 (898).
179 IIL. 377, 53 N.E. 599 (i899).
341n re Goodchild, io F. Supp. 491 (E.D.N.Y., 1935).
3S In re Hirsch, 4 F. Supp. 708 (S.D.N.Y., 1933).
33

112.
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they will be treated as fraudulent, since creditors can only recoup the amount
6
of the cash surrender value created by the premium.3

There can be little doubt that both the Silansky and New York positions
lack the merits of the approach adopted in the Doethiaff and Ross cases. While
the New York rule gives inadequate protection to the insured's dependents, the
Silansky approach gives too much latitude to the insured inclined to predatory
practice. The Ross-Doethlaff line at least has attempted to balance the interests
of creditors with the public policy favoring dependents. Of course, the ideal
solution would be an exemption statute clearly limiting the amount of premiums which could be paid annually without danger of being labelled fraudulent. Such statutes fortunately are becoming more frequent.37 They not only
provide certainty but properly place delicate decisions of public policy in the
hands of the legislatures.
(. as if the contrary opinion would blow up Lombard-street."
Holt, C. J., in Ward v. Evans*
The following comments explore the relation between legal doctrine and commercial practice by examining two specific problems in the field of insurance
law. In each case, a well settled rule of law continues to be challenged by forceful dissents. And in each case, a marked divergence between reasonable lay
expectations and the law is evident. In Lord Mansfield's time, it was considered
sensible and practical for the courts themselves to investigate the understandings of the commercial world. Probably the proximity of the courts to centers of
commercial activity in London was influential in this respect. But the distance
between the courts and laymen today may be intellectual as well as physical.
The need for law revision has been recognized. Equally necessary is the kind of
empirical investigation here recommended.
FIRE INSURANCE AND CHOICE OF PARTIES: THE
VAGARIES OF "MORAL HAZARD"
May one interested in the property insured against fire, but not a party to the
insurance contract, maintain an action directly against the insurer? It has long
been the general rule to deny recovery on the ground that a fire insurance con* 2 Raym. Rep. 928, 930

(1702).

36In re

Goodchild, io F. Supp. 491 (E.D.N.Y., 1935); contrast Doethlaff v. Penn. Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 117 F. 2d 582 (C.A. 6th, 1941) where a court, in a jurisdiction known for a
"liberal" construction approach to such premiums, used a different rule than that limiting
creditors' rights to the amount of cash surrender value created by fraudulent transfers. The
Doethlaff court allows the recovery of the amount fraudulently transferred, as opposed to the
stricter increment theory.
37 An exemption statute clearly indicating how much money may be devoted to the payment of premiums after insolvency spares the courts the task of moderating the conflict between creditors and dependents. For a compilation of these statutes, see Illinois Ins. Code
Ann. 461 (11.State Bar Ass'n, 1939).
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tract is a "personal contract of indemnity."' Fire insurance is predicated on the
existence of an insurable interest' and indemnifies its holder only to the extent
of the loss of that interest. Moreover, in fire insurance cases the courts persistently emphasize the notion that the insurer exercises his choice of parties
with view to their character and moral integrity.3
The logical application of these notions is illustrated by two early English
cases. In Rayner v. Preston4property subject to an executory land contract was
destroyed before the deed was executed. The contract made no reference to the
vendor's insurance. After the vendor had collected from his insurance company, the purchaser paid the purchase price and sued the vendor for the insurance proceeds. The court held that the vendee had no right to the insurance
money since the policy indemnified only the interest of the vendor, i.e., it was a
personal contract of indemnity between the vendor and the underwriter to
which the purchaser was not a party; and therefore unless there was an assignment, s the right to the proceeds could not run, even in equity, to the purchaser.
xIn re Gorman's Estate, 321 Pa. 292, 184 Ati. 86 (1936); Brownell v. Board of Education,
N.Y. 369, 146 N.E. 630 (1925); Draper v. Del. State Grange Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 28
Del. 143, 91 AUl. 206 (1914); Traders' Ins. Co. v. Newman, 120 Ind. 554, 22 N.E. 428 (1889).
239

'An all-inclusive d6finition of what constitutes an insurable interest is impossible. But a
useful rule of thumb might be: such relation or connection with a property interest, that pecuniary benefit or advantage will be derived from its preservation, or a corresponding loss will
be suffered by the happening of the event insured against. Sandlin's Adm'x. v. Allen, 262 Ky.
355, 357, 90 S.W. 2d 350, 351 (1936). See also Davis v. Phoenix Ins. Co., iii Cal. 409, 414
(1896); Tyler v. Aetna Ins. Co., 12 Wend. (N.Y.) 507 (1834).
' It is true that all contracts are in a sense personal and that all contracting parties consider each other's "character and moral integrity"; but it appears that only in the area of fire
insurance do the courts emphasize the notion so persistently. See, e.g., In re Gorman's Estate,
321 Pa. 292, 295, 184 At]. 86, 87 (1936); Brownell v. Board of Education, 239 N.Y. 369, 146

N.E. 639

(1925).

For purposes of the present analysis, contracts generally may be classified into three
categories: (i) the ordinary business contracts, where the parties bargain for a benefit to be
reaped by each within the normal risk of the commercial world (unilateral contracts should
fall within this category); (2) contracts which require payment of a sum to a party upon the
happening of a particular event, including (a) those generally considered wagers (gambling in
the usual sense of the word) and (b) those typified by life insurance where a person having an
insurable interest in his or another's life pays a premium so that upon death a sum of money
becomes payable; (3) contracts of indemnity, like fire insurance.'
Fire insurance, unlike a wagering contract, is based on the existence of an insurable interest, as is life insurance. The latter is distinguishable as involving payment to one who may
have suffered no loss, while fire insurance involves the deterrent of indemnity, i.e., payment
to the insured only in case of loss and to the extent of loss. It has been sigggested that, "[practically, it is not a perfect deterrent, since a few insured persons will burn their own property
in the hope of exaggerating the extent of their losses or of converting non-salable property into
cash." Patterson, Essentials of Insurance Law § 22, at 89 (1935).
4 18 Ch. D. i (i88i).

s It has always been held that fire insurance policies are not assignable before loss. (An
assignment after loss is governed by the general rules of assignment.) The theory is that such
an assignment may increase the "moral hazard" to be borne by the insurer and thus deny his
right to select the parties with whom he will contract. The standard fire policies now in use contain provisions that the policy shall be void if it is assigned before loss, without the written
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The dissenting opinion contended that according to principles of "equity"
the insurance ran with the land and that the vendor was a constructive trustee of
the proceeds for the benefit of the purchaser. In Castellianv. Preston,6 a sequel
to Rayner v. Preston, the insurer was permitted to recover the proceeds, since
the vendor, having been paid the purchase price in full, had suffered no loss.
Although the notion of a fire insurance contract as a personal contract of
indemnity has broken down in the life tenant-remainderman and the vendorpurchaser cases, it has been preserved in the mortgage cases. The separate interests of a mortgagor and mortgagee are each insurable and neither has a right
to the money payable on the other's policy7 Even where a mortgagor covenants
to keep property insured for the benefit, protection, or better security of the
mortgagee, and breaks the agreement by taking out insurance in his own name
without assigning it or making it payable to the mortgagee, the agreement to
insure has been held to create only an equitable lien on the insurance proceeds
in favor of the mortgagee. 8 And, subjecting insurance funds to the equitable lien
consent of the insurer. (This provision may be dispensed with by a rider or similar negating
clause.) The courts have been strict in requiring the insurer's consent. Patterson, Essentials
of Insurance Law § 49, at i83-85 (1935). For a limited adherence to a contrary doctrine, see
Central Union Bank v. N.Y. Underwriters' Ins. Co., 52 F. 2d 823 (C.A. 5 th, 1931) and Whiting
v. Burkhardt, 178 Mass. 535, 6o N.E. i (igoi) which recognize the validity of an assignment
of a mortgagee's rights under the mortgage (loss payable) clause, accompanied by an assignment of the mortgage, even though the insurer's consent to the assignment was not obtained.
Patterson, Essentials of Insurance Law § 49, at 184 (1935).
6 11 Q.B.D. 38o (1883).
7 Farmers' Mutual Ins. Co. v. Young, io4 Lid. App. 139, 1o N.E. 2d 421 (i937); Kozlowski
v. Pavonia Fire Ins. Co., 116 N.J.L. 194, 183 At. 154 (1936); Brant v. Dixie Fire Ins. Co.,
179 S.C. 55, 183 S.E. 587 (i935); Baughman v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., x63 Minn. 300, 204
N.W. 321 (1925); Plum Trees Lime Co. v. Keeler, 92 Conn. i, ioi Atl.509 (1917).
This is also true for all the other property relationships: vendor-purdaser,e.g., Milhous v.
Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., i61 S.C. 96, i59 S.E. 506 (1931); Brady v. Welsh, 200 Iowa 44,
204 N.W. 235 (1925); Mahan v. Home Ins. Co., 205 Mo. App. 592, 226 S.W. 593 (1920); life
tenant-remainderinan,cases cited note ii infra; lessor-lessee, e.g., Hale v. Simmons, 2oo Ark.
556, 139 S.W. 2d 696 (1940); Smith v. Royale Ins. Co., iii F. 2d 667 (C.A. 9th, i94o); conditionalseller-conditionalbuyer, e.g., Nelson v. Nelson Neal Lumber Co., 171 Wash. 55, I7 P. 2d
626 (1932); In re Zitron, 203 Fed. 79 (E.D. Wis., 1913); Grange Mill Co. v. Western Assur.
Co., 118 Ill. 396, 9 N.E. 274 (1886). For a cross-section of cases see Insurance-Right to
Proceeds, 9 2 A.L.R. 559 (i934)8 E.g., Wheeler v. Factors & T. Ins. Co., ioi U.S. 439 (i88o); Carter v. Rockett, 8 Paige
(N.Y.) 437 (1840); Robbins v. Milwaukee Mechanics Ins. Co., 102 Wash. 539, 173 Pac. 634
(i918). The equity exists even though the contract provides that in case of the mortgagor's
failing to procure and assign such insurance, the mortgagee may procure it at the mortgagor's
expense. Nichols v. Baxter, 5 R.I. 491 (i858); Robbins v. Milwaukee Mechanics Ins. Co., 102
Wash. 539, 173 Pac. 634 (1918).
These results are also true in the case of a conditional sales contract where the buyer covenants to insure for the benefit of the conditional seller. E.g., Nelson v. Nelson Neal Lumber
Co., 171 Wash. 55, 17 P. 2d 626 (1932); In re Zitron, 203 Fed. 79 (E.D. Wis., 1913); Grange
Mill Co. v. Western Assur. Co., x18 Ill. 396, 9 N.E. 274 (1886). For a cross-section of cases
see Insurance--Right to Proceeds, 92 A.L.R. 559 (i934).
The equitable lien is said to arise solely from the unperformed contract to protect; the
theory being that since equity regards as done that which ought to have been done, if the
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operates somewhat fortuitously,9 for the mortgagor may collect the proceeds
and abscond before the lien is created; or he may refuse to take the steps neces°
sary to enforce his insurance claim, upon which the mortgagee's lien depends.,
A life tenant and remainderman also have separately insurable interests,"
and unless there exists a fiduciary relationship- or an agreement as to who shall
procure insurance, neither one may collect on an insurance policy taken out
by the other."S However, the life tenant may generally insure up to the full value
of the fee, and upon destruction of the property, collect the whole amount of
the proceeds.'4 Some courts though have held that a life tenant may insure only
mortgagor having so covenanted, fails to make the insurance payable to the mortgagee, or to

assign the same, the fund arising therefrom becomes subject to a lien. E.g., First Nat'l Bank v.
Commercial Union Assur. Co., 40 Idaho 236, 232 Pac. 899 (1925); Houston Canning Co. v.
Virginia Can Co., 211 Ala. 232, 1oo So. 104 (1924); In re Sands Ale Brewing Co., 21 Fed. Cas.
No. 12,307 (N.D. Ill., 1872); For the collected cases see Insurance-Right to Proceeds, 92
A.L.R. 559, 561 (1934).
The manner in which this equitable principle operates was made clear in Stebbins v.
Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 115 Wash. 623, 634, 197 Pac. 913, 916 (1921) where the court said
that even though the policy of insurance may not have been taken out with a view to complying with the contract or with a view to further the security of the creditor, the intent could
make no difference since the contract required that the very thing be done that was done.
Northwestern F. & M. Ins. Co. v. New York Life Ins. Co., 238 Ky. 229, 37 S.W. 2d 67 (i93 i).
First Nat'l Bank v. Cappellini, 149 Pa. Super. 14, 26 A. 2d ii9 (1942) indicates that there is
some authority contra. Nelson v. Nelson Neal Lumber Co., 171 Wash. 55, x7 P. 2d 626
(1932);

Stearns v. Quincy Mutual Fire Ins. Co.,
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Mass. 6i (1878).

9Nelson v. Nelson Neal Lumber Co., 171 Wash. 55, 17 P. 2d 626 (1932); Langford v.
Fanning, 7 S.W. 2d 726 (Mo. App. 1928).
xoSince the recording statutes serve as constructive notice, it is conceivable that in a

mortgage case a court might say that where a covenant to insure is a part of the mortgage,
the insurer has been put on notice and his insuring will be deemed an insurance of both interests "as the interests may appear." See note 27 infra.
"E.g., In re Gorman's Estate, 321 Pa. 292, 184 At. 86 (i936); Bell v. Barefield, 219 Ala.
319, 122 So. 318 (1929). For the collected cases see Life Tenant-Insurance-Remainderman,
X26 A.L.R. 336, 337 (x940).
12A fiduciary relationship exists when a provision in the instrument creating the estate

imposes a duty to insure. See cases cited in 31 C.J.S., Estates §46, at 59 (1942). i Rest.,
Property § 123, subsec. 2 (i936).
'3 E.g., Citizens' Ins. Co. v. Railey, 256 Ky. 838, 77 S.W. 2d 420 (1934); Blanchard v.
Kingston, 222 Mich. 63x, 193 N.W. 241 (1923); Millard v. Beaumont, 194 Mo. App. 69, i85
S.W. 547 (i936); Spalding v. Miller, 103 Ky. 405, 45 S.W. 462 (1898). For the collected cases
see Life Tenant-Insurance--Remainderman, 126 A.L.R. 336, 337 (940).

This does not mean that one cannot insure for the benefit of the other; but if such insurance
is to be effected it must have been the intent of the insuring party to do so. Welsh v. London
Assur. Corp., 1si Pa. 607, 25 Ad. 142 (1892); In re Gorman's Estate, 321 Pa. 292, 184 AUt. 86
(936).
'4

E.g., Bell v. Barefield,
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Ala. 319, 122 So. 318

(1929);

Convis v. Citizens' Mutual Fire

Ins. Co., 127 Mich. 66, 86 N.W. 994 (i9oi); Harrison v. Pepper, i66 Mass. 288, 44 N.E.
222 (x896); Western Assur. Co. v. Stoddard, 88 Ala. 6o6, 7 So. 379 (1889) (recovery allowed on
basis of estoppel because the insurer knew of the partial interest and still insured up to the
full value of the property.)
It is clear that this measure of indemnity is different from the usual measure of indemnity.
However, it has been strongly argued that the test of market value is neither the only test
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up to the value of the life interest,s while others have said that the insurer may
insist on limiting recovery to the value of the life interest even where the premium has been based on the value of the fee.' 6 These courts, however, refuse to
hold that a life tenant's over-insuring is sufficient to give the remainderman a
right to a part of the proceeds. 7 Other courts, feeling that the insurer has received a windfall in that the premium has been calculated on the full value of
the property, have held that the life tenant will be deemed to have been acting
as a trustee for the remainderman and will be required to use the proceeds for
rebuilding or to pay a proportionate part thereof to the remainderman.' 8
nor the proper one in this case. Patterson, Essentials of Insurance Law § 32, at 112 (1935).
The test suggested is "the peculiar value of property to the owner, so long as such value does
not exceed the cost of replacement." The feeling underlying this suggestion is that "the
life tenant cannot replace the building with a sum of money that represents merely the saleable
value of ... [that] interest," and that the life tenant in a sense has a right to the full value
since he has the full use of the full value for life. The feeling may be commendable but the
rules of law require not that the value of something to someone be found (it may be inestimable), but that the objective present value of the interest be determined. The loss sustained
is not the full value of the property inasmuch as the life tenant has never had thefull value,
which is the present value of the life interest and remainder together. One comment suggests, in
speaking of similar breakdowns of the notion of indemnity, that "the public policy behind the
doctrine of strict indemnity is not so much based upon indemnity as such; rather, indemnity
is regarded as a rule of thumb limiting wagering contracts, and concomitantly, fraudulent
fires." Insurance of Mortgaged Property, 88 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 347, 356 (1939). But such a
breakdown of indemnity could itself encourage fraudulent fires since the market value of the
life estate is almost always less than the full value of the property!
The existence of a value policy statute would in many instances be nugatory of strict indemnity. Michigan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Magee, 6 CCH Fire & Casualty Cases 817 (Mo.
App., 1949). Patterson, Essentials of Insurance Law § 32, at 117 (1935)XSDoyle v. Ins. Co., 181 Mass. 139, 63 N.E. 394 (1902); Beekman v. Fulton County Farmer's Ins. Ass'n, 66 App. Div. 72, 73 N.Y.S. iio (igoi); Agricultural Ins. Co. v. Yates, io Ky.
L. Rep. 984 (x889). See Blanchard v. Kingston, 222 Mich. 631, 193 N.W. 241 (1923).
x6In re Gorman's Estate, 321 Pa. 292, 184 At. 86 (936). It was said in Fidelity Ins. Trust
& S.D. Co. v. Dietz, 132 Pa. 36, 18 At. io9o (i8go) that the insurers might have insisted
upon limiting recovery to the value of the life estate; but if they did not do so it was of no
concern to the remaindermen that the life tenant was to receive the full value of the building.
A public policy argument could only be made by the insurer since the remaindermen had
no greater claim to the excess than had the life tenant. The fund represented indemnity for
loss sustained and did not constitute the proceeds of the property destroyed.
It would seem that the insurers' lack of insistence on strict indemnity defeats the purpose
of their insistence that they not be made to bear an increase of moral hazard. This would be particularly true if, as suggested by Professor Patterson, moral hazard"not only embraces the
personal qualities or habits of the insured, but also the external factors (see note 14 supra)
which tend to cause him to burn his property." Patterson, Transfer of Insured Property in
German and in American Law, 29 Col. L. Rev. 691, 702 (1929).
X7E.g., In re Gorman's Estate, 321 Pa. 292, 184 Atl. 86 (i936) and cases cited therein. It
might be argued that the fact that the insurer had an option to rebuild is sufficient to raise
an equity for the remainderman in the cash settlement that followed the insurer's election not
to rebuild, since the exercise of the option would have given the remainderman the use of the
building upon the death of the life tenant. But this argument overlooks the fact that it is an
insurer'soption.
18Clark v. Leverett, 159 Ga. 487, 126 S.E. 258 (1925); Green v. Green, 5o S.C. 514, 27 S.E.
952 (1897). In Clybum v. Reynolds, 3i S.C. 91,9 S.E. 973 (1889) itwas stated that as a matter
of public policy there is always a fiduciary duty between the life tenant and remainderman.
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The majority of American courts in the vendor-purchaser cases have rejected
Rayner v. Preston, but on a theory which is inconsistent with traditional notions
of fire insurance contracts.' 9 They hold that in equity the proceeds of the vendor's policy inure to the benefit of the purchaser. The courts have generally used
a constructive trust to accomplish the desired result. The insured is allowed to
collect the insurance money notwithstanding the fact that the purchaser is
obligated to make full payment; but he is deemed to hold the proceeds as trustee for the purchaser.20 The result has been rationalized by the equity rule which
describes the purchaser under an executory contract as the equitable owner of
the property. A purchaser has even been permitted to institute a suit against
the vendor's insurer to compel that insurer to pay the proceeds to the insured
'9 Dubin Paper Co. v. Ins. Co. of North America, 361 Pa. 68, 63 A. 2d 85 (1949); Russell v.
Elliott, 45 S.D. 184, i86 N.W. 823 (1922); McGinley v. Forrest, 107 Neb. 3o9, 186 N.W. 74
(1921); Millville Aerie Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Weatherby, 82 N.J. Eq. 455, 88 At. 847

(19r3); Mattingly v. Springfield Ins. Co., 120 Ky. 768, 83 S.W. 577 (i9o4); Skinner & Sons
Co. v. Houghton, 92 Md. 68, 48 At. 85 (igoo); Williams v. Lilley, 67 Conn. 50, 34 Ad. 765

(1895); Gilbert v. Port, 28 Ohio St. 276 (1876). Contra: Zenor v. Hayes, 228 In.626, 8i N.E.
ii44 (1907); Marion v. Wolcott, 68 N.J. Eq. 20, 59 At. 242 (I9o4); King v. Preston, ii La.

Ann. 95 (1856); Wilson v. Hill, 3 Metc. (Mass.) 66 (1841); Aetna Fire Ins. Co. v. Tyler, r6
Wend. (N.Y.) 385 (z836). See Brownell v. Board of Education, 239 N.Y. 369, 146 N.E. 630
(1925).

In England, Rayner v. Preston was followed in Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Spooner, [io5] 2 K.B.
753; West of England Fire Ins. Co. v. Isaacs, [1897] 1 Q.B. 226; but was finally rejected by
a Parliamentary statute 15 Geo. V, c. 20, § 47 (1925) which reads as follows: "Any money becoming payable after the date of any contract for the sale of property under any policy of
assurance in respect to any damage to or destruction of property included in such contract
shall, on completion of such contract, be held a receivable by the vendor on behalf of the
purchaser and paid by the vendor to the purchaser on completion of the sale or as soon thereafter as the same shall be received by the vendor." Compare § 69(i) of the German Private
Insurance Law, quoted in Patterson, The Transfer of Insured Property in German and in
American Law, 29 Col. L. Rev. 691, 693 (1929): "Where property insured has been transferred, all rights and liabilities arising out of the contract of insurance subsequent to the transfer pass from the person effecting the insurance and are vested in, and incumbent on, the transferee." Professor Patterson then says, "The present law effectuates [a temporary] automatic
transfer of the insurance contract simultaneously with the transfer of the property. No explicit assignment or agreement is necessary, either as between the transferor and the transferee, or as between either of these and the insurer."
noThis would not be so in a jurisdiction where the risk of loss is placed upon the vendor.

Where this is the case, the vendor is allowed to retain the proceeds. Brownell v. Board of
Education, 239 N.Y. 369, 146 N.E. 630 (1925); Phinizy v. Guernsey, iii Ga. 346,36 S.E. 796
(igoo); Vance, Handbook of the Law of Insurance § 172, at 662 (2d ed., 1930). The rule of law
placing the risk of loss upon the purchaser has been violently criticized. Anderson v. Yaworski,
120 Conn. 390, 18i At. 205 (1935) (the destruction of the house was a substantial failure of
consideration and discharged the purchaser); 4 Williston, Contracts § 940 (rev. ed., i937);
Langdell, Brief on Equity Jurisdiction 58-65 (2d ed., 1926); Griffin, Risk of Loss In Executory
Land Contracts, 4 Notre Dame Lawyer 5o6 (1929); Stone, Equitable Conversion By Contract, 13 Col. L. Rev. 368, 385-87 (i913). The existence of and hardship created by the operation of the rule probably has been one of the strongest inducements to the courts to rule
contrary to Rayner v. Preston. What of the notion of splitting the loss? See Loss Splitting in
Contract Litigation, i8 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 153 (1950).
In many instances the purchaser will be credited with a reduction in price equivalent to the
amount of the insurance proceeds. Transfer of Insured Property, 24 Tulane L. Rev. 378, 381

(1950).
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who would then, under the trust rationale, hold them for the purchaser.2 The
result is contrary to the logical application of the notions of a fire insurance
contract as a personal contract of indemnity. The interest insured is only that
of the vendor. 2 Unlike the life tenant-remainderman case there is nothing here
from which it can be said that the vendor was acting for the purchaser in taking
out the insurance.23
In situations other than the vendor-purchaser case, several other devices
have been used or suggested for use in permitting recovery by persons not parties to the insurance contract and not within the contemplation of the insurer
at the time the contract was executed. A Texas court allowed recovery by an
owner on the theory that the named insured acted as agent for an undisclosed
principal. 24 Of course the facts may not warrant a finding of agency; and even
if a court has been able to establish an agency, the undisclosed principal rule
21Dubin Paper Co. v. Ins. Co. of North America, 361 Pa. 68, 63 A. 2d 85 (i949). Cf.
Swearingen v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 56 S.C. 355, 34 S.E. 449 (i899) (mortgage case). Compare the procedure employed in the Dubin case with the discussion of the equitable lien in the
text at notes 9 and io supra.
The financial outcome of the Dubin case is interesting to note. The plaintiff purchaser
entered into an agreement to buy property for $25,ooo, but before the contract was completed
the property was damaged by fire. The plaintiff in the meantime had insured his interest for
$25,ooo, and the vendor had added $ioooo to the already outstanding $26,500 worth of insurance he held. The property, valued at $6oooo, was damaged by the fire to the extent of
$49,353- Subsequently, the vendee paid the balance of the purchase price and received and
recorded a deed from the vendor. A conference between the insurers resulted in the amount of
the loss being apportioned and two of the insurers sent drafts to the vendor, who returned
them stating that he had received the full purchase price of the property. The vendee claimed
it Was entitled to the proceeds of these policies and sued the insurance companies and the
vendor, claiming that the insurance companies be directed to pay the amounts due under the
policy to the vendor's executor who in turn be directed to pay over such proceeds to the
vendee. On appeal the court upheld the granting of the prayer for $49,353, the amount of the
fire damage. The plaintiff not only did not lose anything because of the fire, but he received
the benefit of his bargain with the vendor.
- The difference between the vendor-purchaser and life tenant-remainderman cases is that
the insurer in the first case must pay the vendee even though there is no actual loss by the
insured; whereas in the life tenant case the insurer is paying more than the actual loss of
the insured.
23 There is in no sense an over-insuring. At the time the vendor's policies were effected he
had an interest up to the full value of the property, unlike the life tenant. It is only at the time
the owner sells and receives a part payment that his interest is reduced, and continued payment of the old premium might be said to be over-insuring. The essential difference is, however,
that in the life tenant-remainderman case the insurer could have known of the insured's limited
interest by inquiring as to the extent of that interest before accepting the premium on the
whole property; but in the vendor-purchaser case he would be forced to inquire continually as
to whether the owner had sold his property. The latter would be an impossible burden on the
insurer. The insurer might avoid that difficulty, however, if he includes in the contract a
clause requiring that the insured notify the insurer immediately at the time of a change in the
insured's interest. If on the other hand the vendor requests a reduction in future premiums on
the basis of his decreased interest the result might be otherwise. Cf. note 56 infra. See also note
37 infra.

24 Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Britt, 254 S.W. 215 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
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itself is not applicable in direct contradiction of the policy provisions's or if the
contract involves elements of personal trust and confidence as does the fire insurance contract.2 6 A Washington court has even gone so far as to reform an insurance contract to allow recovery by a third party, although there was no familiar basis for reformation.27 At most, use of the device involved a dubious
construction of the facts to effect an "equitable" solution.
Again, the use of the real party in interest statutes to permit a third party to
sue an insurance company directly without some other basis would be conversion of a procedural device to a statutory creation of an otherwise nonexisting
substantive right. 2 1 The real party in interest must be one "who can discharge
the duties created"'2 9 and is not necessarily the person who may ultimately be
entitled to the proceeds. In the case of insurance the only party who can discharge the duties is the insured. The cases permitting action by a real party in
interest are all based on an "as the interests may appear" or similar clause and
thus have applied the statutes properly.30
25 If it is "shown... from the terms of the agreement... that the contract was exclusively
with the agent personally, the principal does not become a party thereto... ." 3 C.J.S.,
Agency § 276 (1936). Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Shadid, 68 S.W. 2d 1oo (Tex. Com. App.,
1934) holds this to be the effect of a "sole and unconditional ownership" clause. The policy
under consideration in Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Britt, 254 S.W. 215 (Tex. Civ. App., 1923) had
such a clause but the court nevertheless allowed recovery. The court in the Shadid case tried
to distinguish the Britt holding by saying that there the unconditional ownership clause had
been waived. The opinion in the Britt case, however, gives no indication of such a waiver.
26As long as the contract remains executory the undisclosed principal cannot enforce it
against the will of the other party. Birmingham Matinee Club v. McCarty, 152 Ala. 571,
44 So. 642 (1907); King v. Batterson, 13 R.I. 117 (i88o); Boston Ice Co. v. Potter, 123 Mass.
28 (1877); 2 Am. Jur., Agency § 412 (1936).
27 Robbins v. Milwaukee Mechanics Ins. Co., 102 Wash. 539, 173 Pac. 634 (i918). A made
a conditional sale of certain pool tables to B with the stipulation that B insure for the benefit
of A. B assigned his interest but remained in possession as agent for the buyer and did insure
but not in the original vendor's name. The original vendor, A, brought suit to enjoin payment
to B and to require payment to be made to A. It was held that the insurance agent could have
ascertained the true ownership of the property and that in such cases equity would, if necessary, reform the policy so as to benefit the proper party. The decision was based on Gaskill v.
Northern Assur. Co., 73 Wash. 668, 132 Pac. 643 (1913), where the agent had actual knowledge
of the proper ownership of the property and the insurance company had intended to insure
the proper party. The latter case was one of simple mistake. The facts of the Robbins case on
the other hand indicate no mistake. The court in effect charged the insurer with knowledge of
the conditional sales contract when it actually had none.
as The real party in interest statutes have been interpreted to be procedural only, creating
no new substantive rights. 2 Williston, Contracts § 366 (rev. ed., 1936); Clark, Code Pleading
c. 3, § 25 (2d ed., 1947).
29 Kusmaul v. Stull, 356 Pa. 276, 280, 5i A. 2d 602, 604 (1947); Clark, Code Pleading c. 3,

§ 22 (1928).
30 Capital Fire Ins. Co. v. Langhorne, 146 F. 2d 237 (C.A. 8th, 1945) (vendor-vendee, as

the interests may appear); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 213 Ind. 44, 9 N.E. 2d 138 (1937)
(vendor-vendee, loss payable clause); Riley v. Federal Ins. Co., 6o Ga. App. 764, 5 S.E. 2d 246
(1939) (mortgagor-mortgagee, as theinterests may appear); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Bleedorn,
235 Mo. App. 286, 132 S.W. 2d io66 (1939) (same); Marcy v. New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co.,
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Finally, courts in which persons other than the named insured would be
allowed to recover under a third party beneficiary theory must evade the requirement that both the original parties to the contract intend that the third
party be a beneficiary,31 or draw dubious conclusions of fact to find such an intent. A covenant to insure may evidence the covenantor's intent. In case of
breach equity will disregard his real, but subjective intent not to insure, and
will regard the actual insuring as evidence of intent to comply with the covenant.3 2 But the insurer's intent is not so easily found. To find such intent implied as a matter of law is but another device designed to effect a particular
result.
In the case of fire insurance policies which contain "as the interests may appear" or similar clauses3 it is neither illogical nor devious to hold that a purchaser may maintain an action upon the vendor's policy directly against the
insurer.34 The insurer has explicitly stated his intention to assume the specific
risks involved, knowing that this would, in the end, involve liability to persons
not known to the insurer at the time of the contract. The insurer has made a
promise to insure the property 3s and pay the proceeds to all who may show an
interest within the contemplation of the parties when the contract was exe6
cuted3
54 Minn. 2, 55 N.W. 1130 (1893) (same); Kelner v. Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia, 128 Wis. 233,
io6 N.W. io6o (i9o6) (bailor-bailee, as the interests may appear). For warehouseman cases

see cases cited note 36 infra.
(rev. ed., 1936); 4 Corbin, Contracts c. 41 (I951).
This is under the equitable maxim that equity regards as done that which ought to have
been done. See note 8 supra.
33"On account of whom it may concern" came from and is primarily used in marine in3' 2 Williston, Contracts § 347
32

surance policies. "In trust or on commission" is generally used in policies covering warehouse

goods.
34 Capital Fire Ins. Co. v. Langhorne, 146 F. 2d 237 (C.A. 8th, 1945). "It is not forbidden
by law that a policy should be so framed that the insurance shall be inseparably attached to
the property meant to be covered, so that successive owners, during the continuance of the
risks, shall become, in turn, the parties insured." Waring v. Indemnity Fire Ins. Co., 45 N.Y.
6o6, 6ii (1871).
35Patterson speaks of this problem in terms of assignment and says, "The insurance of
mechandise. . . 'in trust or on commission' makes the insurer's consent to the transfer of
the property unnecessary and even dispenses with any formal assignment of the policy."
Patterson, Essentials of Insurance Law § 49, at 184 (1935).
36 Generally a warehouseman is answerable to the owner of goods for the proceeds of insurance received after loss when the policy is taken out by the former either voluntarily or
pursuant to an express or implied agreement. For the collected cases see WarehousemanProceeds of Insurance, 52 A.L.R. 1409 (1928).
In the case of fire policies which cover goods held by the insured as bailee or warehouseman, under an "in trust or on commission" clause, it is generally held that the owner of the
property, as the real party in interest or the party for whose benefit the p6licy was taken out,
may maintain an action upon the policy directly against the insurer. For the collected cases
see Insurance Policy-Who May Sue, 61 A.L.R. 720, 721 (1929). This general rule may be
limited by the terms of the insurance policy. For example, in the case of provision for adjust-
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An arguable basis for a comparable result may be found in the cases where
one party procures insurance beyond the value of his own interest. If, for example, a life tenant insures up to the value of the fee and the premium is based on
the full value of the property, although the insurer has not expressly stated his
intent, he might be deemed to have assumed the risk of liability to an unknown
person. It may be hard to understand why an insurance company can continue
to collect a premium based on the full value of the property and still not be
liable for payment on that basis. But the insurer has no actual knowledge that
the insured's interest is partial, and there is no justifiable basis for imputing
such knowledge to him unless a general duty to inquire as to the extent of the insured's interest can be imposed upon him.37 The most that has ever been imposed upon an insurer is a burden to inquire about the condition of the property
or the "moral hazard" he is to assume, since the insured is only under a duty
not to conceal material facts fraudulently.38
If a duty to inquire were imposed on the insurer" 9 a third party would clearly
have rights in cases of over-insuring. An exploratory inquiry4o reveals that the
discrepancy between the actual inquiries now made as to the client's legal interest and any inquiries that ought to be made is not great. The agents rarely
ment with and payment to the bailee, a direct action could be maintained only if the bailee
failed to act properly. Wilson & Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., x9o App. Div. 5o6, 179 N.Y.S.
867 (1920), aff'd 229 N.Y. 6r2, 129 N.E. 929 (1920).
Where a statute requires a warehouseman to insure for the benefit of his bailors, the bailor
may maintain an action, as the real party in interest, against the insurer, even though the
warehouseman was the sole named insured in a policy without any "in trust or on commission
clause," and even though the warehouseman started the fire and was himself barred from maintaining the action. In Millers Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Bunds, x58 Kan. 662, 149 P. 2d 350 (1944), the
court said that the insurance contract was really two contracts, one with the warehouseman,
and one with the bailor. See also Gardner v. Freystown Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 350 Pa. 1,37 A.
2d 535 (1944).
37 It could be argued that since other parties who have insurable interests in insured property probably tend to rely on the insurer's promise and since the insurer knows this, it would
not be unreasonable to require an insurance company to inquire as to the nature of the insured's interest. In the case of over-insuring therefore, the insurer would be expected to discover that the insured had only a partial interest. If an insurer over-insures, the knowledge
he would have had, had he inquired, could thus be imputed to him, and he would be deemed
to have clearly manifested his intent to insure the interest of a third party. The objection to
this argument is that reasonable reliance can be found only where there is a covenant to insure,
in which case the covenantor would have an insurable interest up to the full value of the
property. Patterson, Essentials of Insurance Law § 32, at 113 (1935). There would then be no
over-insuring and the insurer's inquiry or lack of it could not possibly demonstrate his intent
to insure the interest of a third party.

38 Patterson, Essentials of Insurance Law § 87, at 386 (i935).
39 The arguments for imposing a duty to inquire are based on the equitable notions described in the text. See p. 124 infra. See also note 70 infra.
40 A questionnaire was prepared and distributed to a group of Chicago insurance agents
picked at random from the telephone classified directory. Forty replies were received. The
returned copies of the questionnaire are at present on file in the Law Library of the University
of Chicago.
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inquire as to whether the client is a life tenant or a remainderman. The probable
explanation is that since the law generally gives the life tenant a right to insure
and collect the proceeds up to the full value of the property, there is no need for
such inquiry. If the law were otherwise the need for inquiry would be very
definite. The fact that many agents do not inquire as to whether a client is a
conditional seller or buyer may be explained by the fact that many do not handle such cases. It was found, however, that all agents do inquire as to whether
the client was a mortgagor or mortgagee and that the great majority make inquiries as to whether the client was a lessor or lessee, or a vendor or purchaser.
Thus the imposition of a duty to inquire and the entailing legal results may not
be too onerous.
In Spires v. Hanover InsuranceCo.,4' the preservation of the principles of the
fire insurance contract were pitted against the seeming "equity" of a third
party's claim. The plaintiff landlord leased certain land and buildings, the lessee
convenanting "to keep the buildings now erected or to be erected.., insured
against loss by fire" and to keep all the leased premises in proper repair.z The
lessee procured a fire insurance policy from the defendant but in his own name.
When the buildings were destroyed by fire, the lessee settled with the insurer.
His settlement, however, gave him an amount equal to the value of the new
buildings only. The lessee refused to file a proof of loss as to the original building or to institute an action against the insurance company. The plaintiff
filed a proof of loss and instituted the present action in his own name against
the insurance company alone. The court sustained the insurance company's
demurrer to the complaint on the ground that it did not show any right of action
by the plaintiff against this defendant. The majority stated that the insurance
was not taken out for the plaintiff's benefit. "The policy of fire insurance is a
personal contract of indemnity against such loss as the insured may sustain;
the insurance is not of the property as such, but of the interestof the insured in
the property."43 Therefore, a lessor may not bring an action on a policy issued in
the name of the lessee even though as against the lessee the lessor might ultimately be entitled to the proceeds. The minority suggested agency, third party
beneficiary or real party in interest theories as rationales for recovery.
Spireswas a hard case because the facts did not warrant a finding of agency so
as to invoke the undisclosed principal rule;44 the plaintiff could not have been
4z 364 Pa. 52, 7o A. 2d 828 (i95o); noted in 36 Va. L. Rev. 548 (ig5o) and 35 Minn. L. Rev.
102 (1950).

42These covenants as construed by the court obligated the lessee to restore the original
building at the termination of the lease if it had meanwhile been destroyed. See Patterson,
Essentials of Insurance Law § 32, at 113 (1935).
43 Spires v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 364 Pa. 52, 56, 70 A. 2d 828, 83o (195o).
44 Since there was no "unconditional ownership" or similar clause in the policy, the application of the undisclosed principal rule would probably have been appropriate. In addition, the
insurance contract was probably no longer executory-the premiums having been paid and
accepted and the obligation having accrued as of the time of the fire--so as to fall within an
exception to the undisclosed principal rule. See notes 25 and 26 supra.
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a real party in interest unless he had a substantive right as a third party beneficiary;46 and though it is true that the lessee might have been deemed to have
insured for the benefit of the lessor,47 the facts did not show an intent on the
part of the insurer to make the lessor a beneficiary.4a An equitable action against
the lessee and the insurance company to settle any cause of action that might
exist between the lessor and the lessee and between the lessee and the insurance
company, as suggested by the majority,49 was probably not a satisfactory

remedy. The lessor in the present case might not have been able to serve process
on the lessee, or the lessee might have been judgment-proof.so Moreover, as between the lessee and the insurance company, the latter might have been able to
defend on the ground that it had already settled with the insured.s" Probably
the only avenue open to the lessor was a direct action against the insurer. However, acceptance of any of the above theories would change the entire basis of
fire insurance law from insurance of a particular party's interest to insurance of
all the interests (as they may appear) in the property.
On the whole, there is probably little demonstrable justification based on
4s There was no "as the interests may appear" clause. See text at note 3o supra. See also
note 3i supra.
46 Authorities

cited note

28

supra.

47 The only discernible purpose of the covenant is to give the lessor additional protection by
binding the lessee to insure for the lessor's benefit. Under the maxim that equity regards as done
that which ought to have been done, the act of insuring has been deemed to have been in compliance with the covenant even though the covenantor insured only in his own name. See
note 8 supra. The majority of the court in the instant case, however, stated that it would not
so construe the act of insuring.
48 There is not only no clause such as "as the interests may appear" but there is not even an
indication that the insurer might have been aware of the existence of the lessor or the lessee's

covenant.
Even if over-insuring were held to put an insurer on notice so as to effect insurance of a
third party's interest, the present case would not be solved since the lessee, being obligated to
replace the building, had an insurable interest in the full value of the property. Patterson,
Essentials of Insurance Law § 32, at 113 (1935).
49 This is the procedure used in Dubin Paper Co. v. Ins. Co. of North America, 361 Pa. 68,
2d 85 (1949). See note 21 supra.
so There are no facts available in either the opinion or the record as to these matters.
However, since the plaintiff was given three opportunities to amend his complaint (during
which time he could have also joined any necessary parties) and did not do so, the fair implication is that the lessee was judgment-proof or service couldn't be had, as suggested.
s, Robinson v. Breuminger, 152 Kan. 644, 107 P. 2d 688 (i94o). The mortgage contained a
covenant to insure but the mortgagor procured a policy in his own name. Upon destruction
of the property the insurance company was notified of the mortgagee's interest. A settlement
was made, however, with the mortgagor alone. After the mortgagor converted the money the
mortgagee brought an action against both the mortgagor and the insurance company. The
court allowed the form of action and held the insurance company liable to the mortgagee,
stating that, "whether the insurance company can be held depends upon the facts relative
to knowledge or notice to the insurer of the rights of the mortgagee." Ibid., at 65i and 692.
As indicated in note 48 supra there is no evidence in either the record or opinion of the
Spires case to show that the insurer was aware of the existence of the lessor or the lessee's
covenant.
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commercial practice, and there are certainly no sound logical bases for effecting
such a change. This becomes clear when one realizes the ease with which the
lessor in the Spires case, for example, might have procured insurance himself
and made the cost of the premium a part of the rent. If he wished to place the
burden of insuring upon the lessee, the lease could have provided that upon the
lessee's failure to insure properly, the lessor could then insure and charge premiums to the lessee. Under such a provision, a careless lessor certainly has no
equities on his side!
There may, however, be an "equitable basis" for making a change in the
present law so as at least to put prospective buyers of fire insurance on notice
that third parties will not be protected unless the policy so stipulates. This
could be done by requiring insurers who wish to come under the doctrine of
Rayner v. Preston to make it clear in the policy that third parties are not included within the coverage. Such a requirement would provide warning to the
laymen who may now wrongly conceive of fire insurance as running with the
land.s2
Probably the general dissatisfaction with the rule of Rayner v. Preston indicates that a fire insurance contract really does have a different meaning for
persons who ordinarily buy insurance than it has for professional insurers. The
decisions contrary to Rayner v. Preston may in themselves give effect to a not
unreasonable lay understanding and encourage the public to entertain such an
understanding.53 It may be felt that the insurance company has assumed a risk
for which a full premium has been paid and that it should not be relieved from
paying on that basis.5 4Someone suffers loss from the destruction of the property
insured; it may not seem a hardship or injustice to the company to require it to
pay the policySS Even the business public may assume that an executory contract for the sale of insured realty carries the protection of existing insurance
s2The lay conception is postulated in Vance, Handbook of the Law of Insurance § 172, at
662 (2d ed., 1930); 98 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 766, 767 (I95O) noting Dubin Paper Co. v. Ins. Co. of
North America, 36i Pa., 68, 62 A. 2d 85 (I949); dissent in Rayner v. Preston, is Ch. Div. i, iS

(i88i) "I believe it [the fire policy] to be considered by the universal consensus of mankind, to
be a policy for the benefit of all persons interested in the property."
53It was said in John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., io Wash.
2d 303, 314, 1i6 P. 2d 539, 544 (1941) that "the insurance would stand as security for the
mortgage debt in lieu of the property destroyed"; and in Doty v. Rensselaer County Mutual
Fire Ins. Co., 188 App. Div. 29, 32, 176 N.Y. Supp. 55, 57 (igir) the court said, "The insurance money takes the place of the house. Whatever interest in the house the plaintiff had, a
corresponding interest attached to the insurance which is a substitute for the house." Likewise
it has been said that "[the property being destroyed, the insurance money stands in lieu
thereof." Robbins v. Milwaukee Mechanics Ins. Co., 3os Wash. 539, 544, 173 Pac. 634, 635
(1918). And in Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 6711.43,46(1873): "the insurance money represented the property destroyed...."
54See Vanneman, Risk of Loss, Between Vendor & Purchaser, 8 Minn. L. Rev. 127, 138
(1923).
55 Ibid. Compare the notion of insurance in the area of workmen's compensation where the
underlying principle is that the insurer is in a better position to distribute the cost of the risk
throughout the community, working no hardship on any one party.
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policies to the purchaserS6 Common sense often seems to substitute the insurance money for the insured property, despite the general rule that the two are
not legally connected.
These conceptions as to the nature of fire insurance, however, are not in
themselves sufficient basis for making an extensive change from insurance of a
particular party's interest to insurance of all the interests in the property. It is
necessary to find that there is no justification for the personal contract notion.
Rayner v. Prestonrests partly on the view that to deny an insurer complete freedom in chosing the insured is to burden him with an unascertainable "moral
hazard."
The results of an exploratory inquiry,57 undertaken to discover the extent to
which insurance agents investigate prospective clients indicate that this emphasis on the personal contract notion may no longer be warranted.5 s The survey shows that none of the replying agents thoroughly investigate a client unless
a special matter indicating that the client may be a bad risk is brought to the
attention of the agent.5 9 The specific inquiries made by each insurance firm
vary greatly, depending on such circumstances as the agent's evaluation of the
client's appearance or the location of the property to be insured. Twenty-three
per cent6 ° of the replying agents make inquiries about the client's fire record.
Ten per cent 6 indicate that they inquire into the client's habits in maintaining
56 Speaking of the automatic transfer of insurance coverage on property which is to be conveyed in the German law, Professor Patterson says that the "automatic transfer... probably
conforms to the transferee's habits and expectations." Patterson, op. cit. supra note ig, at
693. The German law provision is set out in note 19 supra.
There is arguably a significant difference between the case of a vendor selling land and
buildings already insured and the case of a vendor (or purchaser) insuring during the life of a
land contract. The former is much like an assignment of the existing fire policies. Since such
policies are not assignable without the insurer's assent, the automatic transfer and coverage of
both interests by the policy may be more reprehensible than such coverage in the second
case. There, it would have been possible for the insurer to inquire and discern the two existing
interests. Cf. note 23 supra. Consult Insurance Co. v. Updegraff, 21 Pa. 513 (1853), where a
vendor insured the realty sold, but only partially paid for, in his own name, and paid the
premium himself. The court thought it clear that all the parties intended the insurance to
cover the vendee's interest as well as the insuring vendor's since the premium charge was
adequate for such coverage. In neither case, however, would the insurer have had actual
knowledge of the other interest. See note 37 supra.
57 See note 4o supra.

58 An insurance survey consisting of a careful listing of insurance needs, noting existing
insurance, and recommending needed adjustments or additional insurance, is probably what
should be undertaken by each agent in order to assure the client the best possible coverage. For
a detailed discussion of the steps in such a survey see Hedges, Improving Property and Casualty Insurance Coverage, i5 Law & Contemp. Prob. 353, 371 (1950)-

59In some instances no inquiry is made at all unless such circumstances are present.
60 Forty per cent would be the figure if the computation had been made on the basis of the
number of replies indicating that inquiries as to "moral hazard" are made.
61Eighteen per cent would be the figure if based on the alternative method indicated in
note 6o supra.
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and caring for the property, and twenty per cent 6 inquire as to whether the client has, in the past, received any cancellations of fire policies or rejections of his
application for such policies.13 On the other hand, forty-five per cent 4 make no
inquiries at all about the "moral hazard" to be borne by the insurer.6 s Although
these results are in no way conclusive," they seem to indicate that a great deal
of the insurer's protection has been destroyed by the lack of extensive inquiry
by the insurance agent. 67It may not, therefore, be unreasonable to effect a basic
change in the law of fire insurance; 6 but it would be sounder to postpone such
action until further justification is found in more extensive studies of business
practice in this field.
The present alternative is to use some means to guard against common lay
misconceptions as to the nature of fire insurance. When it comes to understanding the myriad of technical and often ambiguous clauses of a fire insurance contract, the lay public is in an unequal "bargaining" position compared to the insurer, the expert. The layman is caught in something in the nature of a "fine
print trap. ' 69 The insurer is in a better position to draft an instrument to serve
62Thirty-six per cent would be the figure if based on the alternative method indicated in
note 6o supra.
63Another object of inquiry is the total amount of insurance carried.
64 This percentage too has been calculated on the basis of the total number of replies.
6sPremiums seem to be based on the amount of coverage and the condition of the property.
The survey indicated that the coverage of more than one interest in the property by a clause
such66 as "as the interests may appear" can be had without any increased premium.
The results are inconclusive for at least two reasons: (i) the interpretation and presentation of the results is necessarily subjective; (2) the sample is much too small. The larger undertaking necessary in order to produce conclusive results would require time and resources not
available to the average student or faculty member. An organization of the magnitude of the
American Law Institute would be necessary.
A larger undertaking might attempt a classification of kinds of insurance agents, e.g., (i)
the single agent with no office, (2) the large firm, (a) in a metropolitan area, (b) in a more
rural area, (3) the specialist, (a) handling realty insurance only, (i) business buildings,
(ii) homes, etc. The possible classifications are almost limitless but such breakdowns may
have significant results.
67It must be recognized that the insurer's own checking in the home office has not been
mentioned. This may be an important element and is certainly worth a separate survey. For
some indication, however, that there is little such checking done, and that most of that
presently done is valueless, see Patterson, Transfer of Insured Property in German and in
American Law, 29 Col. L. Rev. 691, 706-7 (1929).
68The personal contract notion depends, in part, on the assumption that a significant number of fires are fraudulent fires. It has been suggested that "the common carelessness of the
American people is the risk assumed by the insurers doing business in the United States."
Patterson, op. cit. supra note i9,at 705, 7o6. How is this risk increased by a change in ownership? If a fire be proved fraudulent, there is no problem. As for those which cannot be proved
Professor Patterson says "the number of persons who have fraudulent fires must be only a
fractional percentage of the total number of persons insured against fire, and the crucial
question is whether the interests and convenience of honest insured persons should be sacrificed in order to defeat recovery by a small proportion of dishonest persons who succeed in
concealing their crimes." Ibid., at 705.
69The lay position today in understanding the words of the fire insurance contract may be
comparable to the warranty dilemma which flowered little over a century and a half ago.
Warranties were then construed so that even an immaterial breach voided the policy. The
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the needs and understanding of the client and to protect himself by appropriate
clauses drawn in clear, readable language.7° The insurer may of course further
protect himself by properly calculating the premium for the risk he assumes.
Placing this burden upon the insurer would probably not be a hardship; there
would seem to be enough law protecting third parties to put him on notice. 7'
Such a change would be analogous to a development which has taken place
in the surety bond cases. The words of the contract of the compensated surety
are now interpreted liberally in the interest of the third party laborer and materialman rather than strictly in favor of the surety. 72 To a lesser degree, a similar development has taken place in the liability insurance cases where courts
have held73 that the contract should be liberally construed for the protection
of third parties unless the language of the contract is clearly to the contrary.
Many statutes go even further and require that all liability insurance be carried
for the benefit of third parties.74 Courts generally deny rights to third parties
unless the promisor and promisee of a fire insurance contract intended to create
such rights and unless the language of the contract specifically and clearly
established them. Instead, the courts could take the position that the insurance
contract should be construed liberally for the benefit of third parties unless the
words of the policy are clearly and unambiguously to the contrarys and are set
out in such fashion that they are not physically obscured.
inequity was perceived by the courts and, through judicial decision, substantial compliance
with the warranties became sufficient so long as the deviation was such that it did not or
probably would not have affected the issuance of the policy. See Patterson, Essentials of Insurance Law § 61 (1935).
70 A distinction shouldbe recognized between the duty to draft an instrument clearly and the
dutyto inquire, for instance, as to the extent of the client's interest in theproperty orhis need of
an "as the interests may appear" clause. The duty to inquire, however, would be imposed for
the same equitable reasons that the duty to draft clearly is imposed. See p. 124 supra. See
note 39 supra.
It seems that anyone may have an "as the interests may appear" clause upon request and
without any additional charge, yet many agents do not offer the suggestion that such a clause
be included in the policy. This seems a pity for surely such a suggestion in the appropriate
case would be an even more "constructive" aspect of the imposition of a duty to draft clearly.
71'Particularly

in the vendor-purchaser cases.
Corbin, Contracts § 8oo, at 176 (1951). For a thorough analysis of the problem see
Campbell, The Protection of Laborers and Materialmen Under Construction Bonds, 3 Univ.
Chi. L. Rev. 1, 201 (1935).
73 Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Beckwith, 74 F. 2d 75 (1935); Ndw Amsterdam Casualty Co.
v. Jones, 135 F. 2d ii, 196 (1943); 4 Corbin, Contracts § 807 (i95i); Vance, Handbook of the
Law of Insurance § 178, at 684 (2d ed., 193o).
74 In New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Jones, 135 F. 2d 191, i96 (i943), the court's public
policy decision was in some measure based on such a statute. 4 Corbin, Contracts § 807 (1951);
Vance, Handbook of the Law of Insurance § 178, at 686 (2d ed., 1930).
75 Professor Schultz in The Special Nature of The Insurance Contract: A Few Suggestions
for Further Study, 15 Law & Contemp. Prob. 376, 378 (195o) says that to some extent such is
the law, in spite of lip service to other principles, and that, to the extent such is not the law,
it should be.
724
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This change would effect an insurance of all the interests in the property in
the case of ambiguity; though practically it would mean only that liability to
third parties must be denied in clear language. Insurance companies would be in
the same relative position they are in now. Presently justifiable lay expectations
would be checked and the broader change to insurance of all the interests in the
property would be properly postponed until it can be fully justified on the basis
of more extensive studies into the practical context in which these rules of fire
insurance law operate.

TEE NONCUMULATIVE CLAUSE AND RENEWED FIDELITY
BONDS-PIG IN A POKE?
In Columbia Hospitalfor Women v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,r defendant
surety company issued a fidelity bond indemnifying the plaintiff against defalcations by certain named employees, with a maximum indemnity of $5,ooo in
the case of plaintiff's bookkeeper. Renewal was effected by subsequent issuance of a Blanket Position Bond' affording slightly broader coverage. The second bond had no definite date of termination, but was renewable on payment of
annual premiums, subject to the proviso that the payment of such premiums
"shall not render the amount of this bond cumulative from year to year."
Four years after the original bond was issued, a rider was attached, "extending
the term for three years from the renewal date" and respectively substituting
the terms "periods," "premium period" and "agreed premiums" for the words
"years," "premium year" and "annual premiums" wherever they occurred in
the Blanket Position Bond. Three years later, plaintiff discovered that its bookkeeper had embezzled in excess of $4o,ooo over a four year period, $5,498.32

during the year before the rider went into effect, and $3,975.47, $13,28i.45 and
$17,555.9 o respectively during the three years covered by the bond and rider.

The insured accordingly filed a claim for $18,975.47 on the theory that the fidelity company's liability was $5,000 for each year of coverage. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the grant of defendant's motion for
summary judgment, limiting recovery to $5,000.
No authoritative survey has ever been conducted to determine what was an
important question in the principal case, what employers really think they
xi88 F.

2d 654 (App.

D.C., 195).

2 Fidelity bonds can be made out to cover either specifically named employees, or the occupants of designated positions for the time being. The companies have fashioned many different
kinds of bonds, containing various combinations of these two basic features. Among the most
widely used are the Name Schedule or Fidelity Schedule bonds, covering named employees,
with or without indications of position; Position Schedules, bonding the positions listed regardless of which employees occupy them or how often the personnel shifts; and Blanket
Position Bonds, covering all employees of the insured employer for the same amount, regardless of position or name. Riegel and Miller, Insurance Principles and Practices 694, 698-703

(3d. ed., 1947).

